Betterman v. Montana, No. 14-1457. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, concluded: “the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee… does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.” “[B]etween conviction and sentencing, the Constitution’s presumption-of-innocence-protective speedy trial right is not engaged.” The Court left open the possibility that a defendant who suffers inordinate delay “may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Precess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Because no due process claim was raised with the Court in this case, the majority “express[ed] no opinion on how he might fare under that more pliable standard,” though a footnote indicated that relevant considerations for such a claim “may include the length of and reasons for the delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditions sentencing, and prejudice.” The majority also “reserve[d] the question [of] whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to bifurcated proceedings in which, at the sentencing stage facts that could increase the prescribed sentencing range are determined” as well as the question of “whether the right reattaches upon renewed prosecution following a defendant’s successful appeal, when he again enjoys the presumption of innocence.”

Justice Sotomayor, concurring, wrote separately to “emphasize” that the question of the standard to apply to a due process claim for delayed sentencing “is an open one.” But she suggested that the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) may be the appropriate: the “factors capture many of the concerns posed in the sentencing delay context” and “because the test is flexible it will allow courts to take account of any differences between trial and sentencing delays.”

Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring, wrote separately to argue against “prejud[ing]” whether the Barker factors are the correct test for a due process claim relating to a delayed sentencing.

The opinion is available here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1457_21o2.pdf